Saturday, August 10, 2013

Dr. Evil for a day

Most people who work in information security are accustomed to thinking defensively: How can I prevent "bad things" from happening that would damage computers or networks, or allow unauthorized people to view/alter confidential information?  We seldom are in a position to think offensively: How would I attack or damage an opponent's systems or gain access to information the opponent doesn't want me to see?

Edward Snowden's recent releases - mostly through Glenn Greenwald of The Guardian - make it clear that the NSA is very much playing offense - trying really hard to obtain copies of every bit of digital information that US citizens (and those of many other nations) have created.  Thus the NSA gets copies of all phone calls (metadata, and probably call content), emails, files in the cloud, communications on social networks like Facebook, copies of physical letter envelopes.  Several large US based companies have been corralled into this effort, named Prism: Yahoo, Microsoft, Apple, Google, AOL, Facebook, Twitter, Paltalk, perhaps more that have not been revealed so far.

But what does the NSA not have access to unless the FBI physically plants some kind of device or software bug on their targets' computers and networks?  [Note that the NSA targets are all US citizens plus many in other nations.]  As far as we know, the NSA cannot do direct searches or copies of individuals' computer systems, home or business networks.  Why not?  Because in many cases, users may create this data without it ever being transmitted over the Internet.  Imagine plotters in different locations collaborating by creating local information, copying it to USB thumb drives and mailing them to each other.  Do we really imagine that the NSA has not considered this? 

So, if I were director of strategy at the NSA, I would want access to that "last mile", the final refuge of Americans' digital privacy: files stored on their personal computers, including smart phones.  The question is: How do I get it?  I can't have the FBI break into every house and business in the country, at least not yet ;)  But what if I could install spyware and/or botnet clients on every major operating system?  OK, how do I do that?  There are a couple approaches, each with advantages and disadvantages.  I could try to bully Microsoft, Google, Apple and some Linux vendors into installing the spyware/botnet software via patches.  These companies are already part of Prism, so in theory, I could just extend the "Prism walls".  But what if that's just too obvious?  What if the Prism companies successfully push back, or tie me down for years with legal challenges? 

So I move to plan B: I approach the major US anti-malware companies, like Symantec, McAfee, ESET, more.  Anti-malware software is installed on almost every home and work PC/Mac computer.  So I get National Security Letters and force them into the Prism program.  Then I require them to add a "high quality (think Stuxnet) spyware/botnet client" that is capable of reporting on and even sending copies of every file a user possesses or reads via web access.  If, or when, I'm found out, I can always insist that this is totally for national security, to help catch terrorists, and that citizens with nothing to hide have no reason to worry.  Isn't that what the East Germans and the Nazis said?   [Note that savvy tech users who monitor their outgoing connections should be able to spot something odd going on, and even block it.  That situation could require more collaboration with Symantec, McAfee - Require them to allow the NSA to access users' systems from Symantec, and McAfee IP addresses.]

Ok, let's turn off Dr. Evil.  As far as I know, the anti-malware companies are not in the Prism program.  But it could happen.... unless we show a lot more resistance than we have been.

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